Equitable Considerations Held Not Applicable to Defense of Lack of Overpayment--\u3cem\u3eDysart v. United States\u3c/em\u3e by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 4 
1966 
Equitable Considerations Held Not Applicable to Defense of Lack 
of Overpayment--Dysart v. United States 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Equitable Considerations Held Not Applicable to Defense of Lack of 
Overpayment--Dysart v. United States, 64 MICH. L. REV. 721 (1966). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/9 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
February 1966] Recent Developments 
Equitable Considerations Held Not Applicable to 
· Defense of Lack of Overpayment-
Dysart v. United States* 
721 
Taxpayer treated the proceeds of a judgment recovered in 1954 
as capital gain. Although the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
did not object to the capital-gain treatment,1 he assessed a penalty 
• 840 F.2d 624 {Ct. Cl. 1965) {hereinafter cited as principal case). 
l. Principal case at 633. 
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tax for failure to report the judgment in a declaration of estimated 
income for 1954.2 In 1958 the regulation providing for the penalty 
tax was declared invalid,8 and taxpayer filed a timely claim for re-
fund. Although an independent affirmative action by the Commis-
sioner contesting the 1954 return would have been barred by the 
statute of limitations,4 the Commissioner disallowed the refund, con-
tending that because the proceeds of the 1954 judgment should have 
been treated as ordinary income, the taxpayer had not in fact over-
paid his 1954 tax. On taxpayer's motion to the Court of Claims for 
summary judgment, held, denied, nvo judges dissenting. When a 
taxpayer sues for a refund, the Commissioner's right to offset against 
the overpayment an underpayment of tax with respect to a separate 
item in the same tax return is subject neither to the statute of limi-
tations nor to equitable considerations. 
Courts have long struggled with the problem of the offsetting 
of mutual debts, a problem further complicated when one of the 
claims is barred as an independent cause of action by the passage of 
time. If the stale counterdemand5 satisfies the traditional require-
ments of a set-off-a claim of liquidated debt arising out of a trans-
action extrinsic to that in controversy-it is defeated by the statute 
of limitations.6 The effect of the statute of limitations as a bar to the 
stale counterdemand can be avoided if the counterdemand is in the 
nature of a recoupment-a claim arising out of the same transaction 
in controversy7-but the equitable doctrine of laches limits the time 
2. The penalty was assessed pursuant to Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.294-l(b)(3)(A) (1943), 
interpreting Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 63, § 118(a), 58 Stat. 37 (1944), amending 53 
Stat. 88. • 
3. Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), afj'd, 361 U.S. 87 (1959). 
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 650l(a) requires assessment of any tax under the title 
to be imposed within three years after the return was filed, unless otherwise provided 
by law. 
5. The term "counterdemand" is used in this note to signify a claim set up by 
the defendant in opposition to the complaint of the plaintiff, and includes both a 
demand for an affirmative recovery and a demand for· a reduction in the plaintiff's 
recovery. 
6. A set-off is a claim arising out of subject matter extrinsic to the subject matter 
of the suit. It involves a debt which is either liquidated or capable of liquidation, and 
will support an affirmative recovery on the part of the defendant. WATERMAN, A 
TREATISE ON THE I.Aw OF SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT Se COUNTERCLAIM §§ 2·6 (1st ed. 1869). 
See generally CLARK, CODE PLEADING 635-36 (2d ed. 1947). A set-off is subject to the 
bar of a statute of limitations. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 
422, 425 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Keckley v. Payton, 157 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. W. Va. 1958); 
Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 390, 392 (Ct. CI. 1955); CLARK, 
op. cit. supra, at 636; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.11 (2d ed. 1964). 
7. Recoupment, an equitable remedy, is a purely defensive claim seeking to reduce 
or eliminate plaintiff's recovery but not allowing an affirmative recovery by the defend-
ant. WATERMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 413-25. See generally CLARK, op, cit, supra 
note 6, at 633-35; McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment in Federal Taxation, 28 
VA. L. REV. 577 (1942). "Such a defense [recoupment] is never barred by the statute 
of limitations so long as the main action itself is timely." :Bull v. United States, 295 
U.S. 247,262 (1935). 
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within which the counterdemand may be offset against the original 
claim.8 The court in the principal case, however, surmounted the 
bars imposed upon counterdemands by statutes of limitation and the 
doctrine of !aches and sanctioned a separate classification of counter-
demand-the defense of lack of overpayment. This category of coun-
terdemands applicable regardless of any time limitations includes 
all counterdemands on the part of the Commissioner concerning 
the same tax for the same year by the same taxpayer. Thus, the Com-
missioner has acquired a powerful advantage in a narrow category 
of cases, for regardless of his own lack of diligence he need only 
show an underpayment with respect to the taxpayer's total tax re-
turn to reduce or eliminate the taxpayer's recovery. 
While appearing to do justice, since the Commissioner, though 
not allowed to harass the taxpayer by making affirmative claims 
after the expiration of a statute of limitations, is allowed to prevent 
a taxpayer from obtaining a refund on one item while owing the 
government on another item in the same tax return, the decision of 
the court in the principal case is subject to several criticisms. First, 
it appears to be based upon a misapplication of prior case law. The 
defense of lack of overpayment was first enunciated in Lewis v. Rey-
nolds,9 in which the Supreme Court allowed the Commissioner to 
offset a tax deficiency against a taxpayer's refund claim, despite the 
£act that the Commissioner was barred by the statute of limitations 
from bringing a separate action. The Lewis Court reasoned, as did 
the court in the principal case, that the taxpayer had not in £act 
overpaid his tax and that, regardless of the statute of limitations, his 
entire tax liability for the same year was subject to redetermination. 
The Lewis Court pointed out that the refund action was "in the 
nature of an action for money had and received"10-the equitable 
action of assumpsit. The £act that the Court in Lewis mentioned 
equitable considerations-an unnecessary discussion if the defense 
of lack of overpayment is unconditional-implies that the court did 
not view the defense as unconditional. Certainly the Lewis decision 
does not preclude courts from looking beyond the question of lack 
of overpayment to see if other relevant equitable considerations 
should be applied. The citing of Lewis in the principal case for the 
proposition that equities are irrelevant in a consideration of the de-
fense of lack of overpayment is contrary to the implication in Lewis 
that equities are indeed relevant, and is also contrary to numerous 
Supreme Court holdings that an issue not ruled on by the Court 
cannot be considered as having been decided so as to constitute prec-
8. See McNaghten v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 509, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1937). 
9. 284 U.S. 281 (1932). 
10. Id. at 283. 
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edent.11 Indeed, one Six.th Circuit opinion has expressly labeled the 
Lewis doctrine of lack of overpayment an equitable defense com-
parable to equitable recoupment.12 Furthermore, the Court of 
Claims itself has stated that the Lewis doctrine is an equitable offset 
based on equitable principles.13 
Second, the court in the principal case was in error in seeking 
to analogize the principal case to cases arising under the mitigation 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,14 which allow either a 
taxpayer or the Commissioner to recover on a claim barred as an 
independent cause of action by the statute of limitations if the stat-
utory requirements are met. In such cases the statute precludes 
equitable considerations. The court in the principal case said that 
the same rationale should apply if the requirements for the defense 
of lack of overpayment are met.15 While Congress did place certain 
factual situations within the purview of the mitigation provisions, 
it did so with the intent to "supplement the equitable principles 
applied by the courts"16 to prevent injustice. By providing a statu-
tory remedy to determine the court's course of action in certain 
limited factual situations, Congress could not have intended to pre-
clude traditional applications of equitable principles in situations 
not specifically governed by the statute. 
Third, a forceful argument can be made that the Commissioner's 
defense in the principal case meets the traditional requirements of 
a recoupment, and thus is to be governed by equitable principles.11 
The claim of the taxpayer and the defense of the Commissioner 
seem to satisfy the "same transaction" requirement, for both concern 
the same tax liability-the taxpayer's treatment of the 1954 judg-
ment. Just as in a contract situation one daim on a contract can be 
established as a recoupment defense against a separate claim on the 
11. Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211, 218 (1935); United States v. Mitchell, 
271 U.S. 9, 14 (1926); Wepster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925). 
12. Routzahn v. Brown, 95 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1938). While this decision did not 
rest precisely on the issue of the equitable nature of the Lewis doctrine, the court made 
it clear that, although the case concerned the appropriateness of amendments to plead• 
ing by the govemment, the equitable nature of the defense raised by the government 
was an important element in the decision. "What we have to decide is a question that 
transcends technical rules of pleading and involves the question of whether the United 
States • • • may . • • assert in diminution of the plaintiff's right to recover a tax 
liability ••• the doctrine of equitable recoupment." Id. at 769-70. 
13. "The right of allowing an offset ••• is an equitable right given to the govern• 
ment based on the equitable principles and, as such, should not be abused," Missouri 
Pac. R.R. v. United States, 338 F.2d 668, 672 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
14. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1311-15. 
15. Principal case at 628. 
16. S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 49 (1938). This report deals with Int. 
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, § 820, 52 Stat. 581, which was the predecessor to the 
mitigation provisions of the 1954 Code. 
17. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. The dissent in the principal case 
indicates that this is a recoupment situation. The Commissioner sought the recoupment 
remedy of reduction of the taxpayer's recovery. Brief for Defendant, pp. 5·10, 
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same contract,18 so in the principal case one claim on the liability 
of a taxpayer can be set up as a recoupment defense against a sep-
arate claim based on the same liability.19 If the Commissioner's de-
fense is indeed a recoupment, equitable principles apply by the 
nature of the action.20 The court in the principal case avoided the 
application of equitable considerations by distinguishing this case 
from the general doctrine of recoupment and classifying it within a 
narrower category of cases involving the same tax for the same year 
by the same taxpayer. As Chief Judge Cowen pointed out in dissent, 
however, it is difficult to see the relevance of this distinction in de-
ciding whether equitable considerations are appropriate in a recoup-
ment situation.21 It would seem no less fair to subject the Com-
missioner's defense to equitable considerations when that defense 
concerns the same tax for the same year by the same taxpayer than to 
subject it to similar considerations when the defense concerns the 
same transaction but different taxes, years, or taxpayers. In both 
cases, only a single transaction is involved, whether it concerns 
various parts of one tax return or one part in each of several tax 
returns. The lack of overpayment is the same in either case. The fact 
that the class of cases involving a single tax return lends itself to an 
easy classification is not a compelling reason to work a basic change 
in a long-standing policy of law. 
Fourth, attention must be paid to the nature of a tax-refund ac-
tion, in which a taxpayer must have paid his tax before he can 
challenge the validity of the imposition.22 The Commissioner, in 
levying and collecting the taxes, would in reality appear to be the 
claimant of the tax money, but the requirement that the taxpayer 
pay :first and then sue places the taxpayer in the position of formal 
claimant. The taxpayer bears the burden of persuasion and must 
18. Branch v. Wilson, 12 Fla. 543, 550 (1868). 
19. "The doctrine of recoupment is not limited to a claim arising directly from the 
particular contract sued upon. It is sufficient if it arises out of the same subject matter, 
and that the claims are susceptible of adjustment in one action." Mills v. United States, 
35 F. Supp. 738, 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1940). 
20. Even if it can be successfully advanced that the Commissioner's defense is a 
set-off-i.e., that the defense fails to meet the requirements for recoupment because 
the claim is found to arise out of a separate transaction-cognizance of equitable 
considerations is still necessary. Only a showing of special equitable considerations 
demonstrating the injustice of applying the statute of limitations would justify the 
court in lifting its bar. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 636 n.17 and accompanying 
text. See North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Saint Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U.S. 596, 
615 (1894). 
21. Principal case at 631. 
22. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935). To challenge the validity of 
a tax assessment in the federal district courts or in the Court of Claims, the taxpayer 
must pay the tax and then sue for a refund. On the other hand, a taxpayer may refuse 
to pay the tax and file a petition with the Tax Court challenging the validity of the 
tax. T,he Tax Court, being limited to deficiency cases, has no jurisdiction over refund 
cases. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INCOME, EsrATE & GIFr TAXATION 23 (3d ed. 1964). 
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prove his right to the refund, rather than the Commissioner having
to prove his right to collect the tax.23 Thus, the Commissioner, with
the aid of the courts, has built into the tax system a legal device for
the acquisition of funds which may subsequently be utilized to sat-
isfy debts owed to the government but which the government is
barred by law from collecting on its own initiative. Whatever super-
ficial merit it may have, the rule laid down by the court in the prin-
cipal case, allowing the Commissioner to use this device without
regard to equitable considerations, should be rejected as a rule of
unconditional application, since by removing a check on the Com-
missioner's conduct in handling tax returns it has taken from the
taxpayer both the legal and equitable remedies designed to protect
him from arbitrary actions of the government.
23. Bull v. United States, supra note 22, at 260.
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